4. Scotus’ own Reasons against Henry

47. Without relying on these arguments then [nn.37-40], I lay down two other arguments for the principal conclusion [nn.38, 52].

The first is: natural reason shows something to the intellectual creature that is to be loved supremely, because in all objects and acts (and that in essentially ordered ones) there is something supreme, and so some supreme love -and thus some object too that is supremely lovable. But right natural reason does not show anything to be supremely lovable other than the infinite Good, because, if it did, charity would incline to the opposite of what right reason dictates and so would not be a virtue; therefore it dictates that only the infinite Good is to be supremely loved. And consequently the will has from natural resources the power for this love; for the intellect cannot rightly dictate anything which, as dictated, the will has naturally no power to aim and tend toward; or, if so, the will would be naturally bad, or at any rate it would be non-free as to tending toward anything according to the idea of good in accord with which the thing is shown to it by the intellect. And this is what was said specifically about the Angels [2 dd.4-5 n.37], that in the state of innocence they were not non-right, for they were unable then to have a non-right act; and they could not have had some non-right elicited act - but one must suppose they had some act,     therefore a right one; and no act could be right save by loving God above all things; therefore etc     .

48. The second reason is as follows: the Philosopher in Ethics 9.9.1169a18-20 holds that a brave citizen should expose himself to death for the good and utility of the republic. Now the Philosopher would not posit that such a citizen will have any reward after this life, as is plain from the many places where he doubts whether the soul is mortal or immortal, and he seems rather to incline to the negative side [cf. Ord. 4 d.43 q.2 nn.13-15] - at any rate if anyone, following natural reason, is in doubt about a future life, he should not, for the sake of a life he doubts, expose himself to risk where the loss of political good and virtue is certain. Therefore, with all future reward is set aside, it is consonant with right reason that every brave citizen wish himself not to live so that the good of the republic not perish. But according to right reason the divine and political good is more to be loved than the good of any particular thing; therefore according to right reason everyone should wish himself not to live because of the divine good.

49. Here a statement is made [Godfrey of Fontaines] that the brave man, in exposing himself to death because of the good of virtue, experiences virtue’s greatest good and greatest pleasure; and for the sake of these very great goods, though brief, he should more choose and love such an act than a life of ignominy; for one intense act is better, as is said in Ethics 9.9.1169a22-25, than any number of non-intense ones; so in this regard the brave man does not choose his own nonexistence but his best existence according to act of virtue - and this best existence is, according to right reason, more to be chosen than many other advantages along with lack of virtue.

50. Against this: he for preserving whose safety and for whom, lest evil happen, I wish something else not to be is simply to be loved more than that other thing that I do not wish for his sake not to be; but such a brave citizen, lest evil befall the republic, wishes himself and his act of virtue not to be; therefore he simply loves more the public good (which he wishes to be preserved) than himself or his act of virtue, for whose preservation he does not expose himself but for the salvation of the republic. And thus does the argument stand [n.48].

51. A third reason is added (and it is a sort of theological one), that if anyone can have, by natural power, a perfect act of virtue of loving God above all things, then he who found himself inclined to such an act could know that he was in charity, because without charity there would be no such inclination to love God above all things.

52. The consequent is false [n.51], therefore the antecedent is too.